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1 Introduction
What is exploitation? In political philosophy, the most general definition affirms that A
exploits B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of B. Despite its intuitive appeal, this
definition leaves two major issues in need of a precise specification, namely the kind of un-
fairness involved and the structure of the relationship between A and B that allows A to take
advantage of B. There is considerable debate in the economic and philosophical literature
on both issues. Although both aspects of exploitative relations are arguably crucial, and a
full-fledged theory should include an account of the structural dimension of exploitation,1
the analytical focus of this paper is on the unfairness, or more precisely, on the economic
inequalities involved in the concept of exploitation.2
To be specific, this paper analyses the concept of exploitation as the unequal exchange
of labour (hereafter, UEL). At the most general level, according to UEL theory, exploitative
relations are characterised by systematic differences between the amount of labour that
individuals ‘give’ to the economy, in some relevant sense, and the amount of labour that
they ‘receive’, in some relevant sense. Yet, there are many conceivable ways of defining the
labour given and received by agents. In his seminal book on exploitation theory alone, John
Roemer examines no fewer than six distinct UEL definitions (see Roemer [29], Part I and
pp.121, 132-133, 168), and many other approaches have been proposed in the literature.3
Alternative UEL definitions may seem to differ for relatively minor, and merely technical
details. At a closer look, however, some deep theoretical cleavages emerge and different UEL
approaches incorporate such distinct normative and positive intuitions that it is legitimate to
wonder whether they actually bear any family resemblance. In some approaches, exploitation
is defined as a property of individuals and “refers to the relationship between a person
and society as a whole as measured by the transfer of the person’s labor to the society,
and the reverse transfer of society’s labor to the person” (Roemer [31], p.31). In others,
1For a thorough discussion of the limits of purely distributive accounts, and a defence of the importance
of the notions of power, force and coercion in exploitation theory, see Veneziani [43].
2Alternatively, one may interpret our analysis as focusing on the measurement of exploitation, which is
relevant even in approaches that reject the idea that exploitation is (primarily) an injustice (e.g., Holmstrom
[17]; Reiman [26]; Wood [49], fn.15). For a discussion of the structural aspects of exploitation, see Arneson
[1]; Warren [48]. Domination is central in the approach developed by Vrousalis [47].
3The literature is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. Classic contributions include Morishima
[22]; Duménil [5]; Foley [14]; Roemer [28]; and Flaschel [10, 11]. For a discussion, see Yoshihara [50, 51].
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exploitation is primarily a relation between individuals (e.g., Holmstrom [17]; Fleurbaey
[13]). The normative content of the notion of UEL exploitation is also contested. According
to Elster ([7], p.167), “Being exploited means, fundamentally, working more hours than are
needed to produce the goods one consumes,” and thus exploitative relations are affected by
saving/investment decisions. Other authors, instead, emphasise purchasing power and the
idea that “workers give more labor to their employers than they receive through the goods
their wages can afford” (Fleurbaey [13], p.653), and consumption decisions are irrelevant to
define exploitation status. And so on.
This paper explores the foundations of UEL exploitation in an abstract economic envi-
ronment. The main purpose of the analysis is descriptive: we aim to identify the core of UEL
theory that is shared by all of the main approaches in the literature. The (often implicit)
intuitions incorporated in the various definitions are rigorously formalised as separate ax-
ioms, and thoroughly examined. Then, a single domain condition called Labour Exploitation
is formulated, which summarises the foundations of UEL exploitation theory and identifies
the set of admissible definitions.
Domain axioms are routinely formulated and analysed in social choice theory and ax-
iomatic bargaining theory.4 They do not represent full-fledged theories or definitions. Rather,
they can be interpreted as meta-properties which usually identify the main object of research
(e.g., a social welfare functional, a social welfare ordering, or an allocation mechanism), the
space in which such object is analysed (e.g. welfare allocations, or economic environments
with certain properties), and some foundational properties defining the set of admissible so-
lutions (e.g. completeness, transitivity, or single-valuedness). Domain axioms thus delineate
the basic perimeter of the theoretical exercise.5
4See, for example, the thorough discussion in chapters 2 and 3 of Roemer [33].
5For example, in the standard Nash approach to axiomatic bargaining, the object of analysis is a mecha-
nism F that identifies a solution to any possible two-agent bargaining problem and the space of analysis is
given by a pair (S, d) where S is a compact, convex set in R2 and d ∈ S. Then, the Axiom of Unrestricted
Domain states that F is a mapping from the set of all pairs (S, d) such that S contains a point s > d into S.
According to Roemer ([33], section 2.5), however, the proper object of analysis should be a correspondence ϕ
that maps a given economic environment into a lottery. His Axiom of Domain requires that the mechanism
ϕ be defined on the class of economic environments comprising two agents endowed with von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities defined on a compact, convex set of lotteries, and such that the status quo point is not
on the weak Pareto frontier. In his analysis of axiomatic mechanism theory, Roemer ([33], chapter 3) also
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No such axiom exists in exploitation theory: it is not clear a priori what the object and
space of the analysis are, and the information relevant to define exploitation has hardly been
explicitly and systematically discussed. This paper fills the gap in the literature: it identifies
a domain property that defines the object and the space of analysis of UEL exploitation
theory, and some normatively relevant restrictions on the information that can be brought
to bear in identifying the appropriate definition of exploitation.
Labour Exploitation is rigorously stated in section 6, however it expresses the following
idea: at any allocation, given any definition of exploitation, the exploitation status of every
agent is unambiguously determined by comparing the labour that she ‘gives’ to the economy,
and the labour she ‘receives’. The former quantity is a scalar and it captures the labour
contributed, or spent in productive activities. The labour agents ‘receive’ is a (possibly
degenerate) interval and it is determined by identifying two (possibly equal) commodity
bundles, which should be affordable and technically feasible, and the labour associated with,
or contained in them, which is (a linear transformation of) the labour necessary to produce
them as net output. If the labour contributed is more (resp., less) than the maximum
(resp., minimum) amount of labour received, then the agent is regarded as exploited (resp.,
an exploiter). Labour Exploitation sets weak restrictions on the way in which the set of
exploiters and the set of exploited agents are identified and it is shown that indeed all of the
main approaches satisfy it.
It is important to stress at the outset that, although we believe there are good reasons to
focus on labour as a variable of normative interest, and in many economic contexts the notion
of exploitation is inextricably linked with some form of labour exchange,6 our aim is not to
defend the normative relevance of the distributive aspects of UEL exploitation theory. Nor
does the paper propose a specific UEL definition. Rather, our main objective is to clarify a
considers objects of analysis with more structure (e.g. by postulating that “the allocation mechanism F is
a full correspondence which is essentially a function” Roemer [33], p.98) and informationally richer spaces
of analysis (e.g. economic environments including information concerning what utility represents and what
the resources in the economy are, certain restrictions on admissible utility functions, and so on).
6Tellingly, after criticising the UEL approach and suggesting to replace it with a definition based on
property relations (PR), Roemer has later acknowledged the importance of labour in exploitation theory. He
has proposed that “an agent is ... capitalistically exploited, if and only if PR holds and the exploiter gains by
virtue of the labor of the exploited” (Roemer [32], p.96). For, “the expenditure of effort is characteristically
associated with exploitation” (Roemer [32], fn.11).
4
number of views and intuitions that are widely, albeit implicitly held in the literature, and to
provide a rigorous formal and conceptual framework to analyse UEL exploitation. Although
this leaves the questions of the injustice of the allocation of labour and of the appropriate
UEL definition open, a clear statement of the foundations of UEL theory is necessary in
order to tackle both issues.
Furthermore, our theoretical exercise does have some relevant normative implications.
Because domain axioms identify the object and space of analysis, and the information that
can be brought to bear in the investigation, they normally impose minimal normative re-
strictions (compared, for example, to axioms explicitly embodying ethical properties such
as Hammond Equity, the Pigou-Dalton condition, Anonymity, and so on). Nonetheless, the
definition of a domain axiom is not a merely technical exercise. As is well known in social
choice theory, certain domain restrictions — most notably, welfarism but also transitivity and
completeness — have significant ethical implications by restricting the normatively relevant
information in certain ways, or by implicitly or explicitly ruling out certain approaches. Fur-
thermore, certain ethical properties may be plausible in certain domains but not in others.7
Labour Exploitation is no exception, as it incorporates the basic normative intuitions of UEL
theory that are shared by all of the main approaches in the literature.
Methodologically, this paper represents a first important step in the development of a
novel axiomatic framework to analyse exploitation using the standard tools of social choice
and axiomatic bargaining theory.8 For, if Labour Exploitation is a domain condition identi-
fying the class of admissible exploitation forms, then it provides the conceptual and formal
framework to identify the appropriate definition, which can be characterised by imposing
additional, ethical properties. We return to this issue in sections 7 and 8 below.
7For example, Roemer ([33], chapter 2) argues that in axiomatic bargaining theory the standard Nash
axioms are plausible in a welfaristic setting but not on informationally richer economic environments. He
also shows that the axiom of welfarism plays a key role in the characterisation of the Nash mechanism and
“when Nash bargaining theory is restated on the domain of economic environments that motivates the Nash
axioms, those axioms are weak in the sense that many mechanisms exist that satisfy them” (Roemer [33],
p.87).
8An axiomatic approach was long overdue in exploitation theory. Exceptions include Hollander [16] and,
more recently, Yoshihara and Veneziani [52]; Veneziani and Yoshihara [44, 45, 46]; and Yoshihara [50].
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2 The structure of UEL theory
In order to illustrate the key conceptual issues, consider the baseline case of a two-class
economy in which one good, say corn, is produced by means of itself and labour. To be
specific, a < 1 units of corn seed and L > 0 units of (a single type of homogeneous) labour
are necessary to produce one unit of corn. Assume that all agents have the same skills.
Suppose further that capitalists save and accumulate, while all workers earn a subsistence
wage and consume the same (subsistence) amount of corn c. Under these rather stringent
assumptions, the definition of UEL exploitation is relatively uncontroversial. Let v denote
the amount of labour necessary to produce one unit of corn: this comprises both the amount
of labour L directly necessary in production and the amount of labour contained in the corn
seed, va. Formally, v = va+ L and so v = L (1− a)−1. Then agent ν is exploited (resp., an
exploiter) if and only if the labour she expends in production, λν , is greater (resp., lower)
than the labour contained in c, vc.9
In this paper, we argue that the definition of an agent’s exploitation status requires the
identification of three separate normative benchmarks. The first is the amount of labour
that the agent gives, or contributes - which, in this setting, is simply equated to the labour
time performed in economic activities, λν . The definition of the amount of labour received,
instead, requires the definition both of a relevant bundle (or, more generally, bundles) received
by the agent, which can be called the exploitation reference bundle(s) (henceforth, ERB(s)),
and of the labour associated with, or contained in it - here, respectively, c and vc.
In the simple economy considered, all three benchmarks are relatively uncontroversial.10
As soon as the restrictive assumptions on technology, behaviour and endowments are relaxed,
however, the definition of the labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ by agents is not obvious, and
several approaches have indeed been proposed. For example, if agents have heterogeneous
skills, then perhaps one should focus on effective (i.e. skill-adjusted) labour contributed,
rather than time expended in production. But maybe not.
Similarly, if more general technologies are considered (allowing, for example, for joint
products), the naïve generalisation of the standard definition of labour received can yield
9In this paper, we follow the literature and consider exploitation within a given time period. For an
analysis of the complications arising in a dynamic setting, see Elster [7] and Veneziani [42, 43].
10These arguments can be easily generalised to n-good economies.
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paradoxical results - such as bundles containing a negative amount of labour, as famously
shown by Steedman [40] - and so various definitions of the labour contained in a given bundle
have been proposed. As Roemer ([30], p.283) puts it, “If the production set is complicated
in various ways, then it is not possible to give an unambiguous definition of what ‘labor-
embodied’ means”.
Finally, if agents do not consume a given, equal subsistence bundle, then the choice of
the ERB(s) is not obvious: it could be either the bundle actually consumed by an agent, or
some normatively relevant bundle(s) unrelated to individual consumption decisions.
Different choices reflect different normative and positive intuitions. In the next section,
we illustrate the range of possible approaches to UEL exploitation in an abstract economic
environment by focusing on some of the classic definitions proposed in the literature.
3 The framework
We analyse UEL exploitation theory at an abstract level. Hence, in what follows, we impose
only minimal restrictions on endowments, technology and preferences, and make no assump-
tions concerning agents’ behaviour - agents may be standard utility maximisers, or they may
be characterised by some form of bounded rationality.
Let N = {1, ..., N} be the set of agents, with generic element ν ∈ N , and let M =
{1, ...,M} be the set of produced commodities in the economy. Let R (resp., R+) denote the
(resp., nonnegative) real numbers. Let P be the production set, describing the technologically
feasible production techniques. Elements of P , activities, are vectors denoted as α, which
describe the amount of effective labour αl and the vector of produced goods α used as inputs
in order to produce a vector of outputs α.11 We assume that technology displays constant
returns to scale.12 Denote the vector of net outputs (outputs minus inputs) arising from α
as bα ≡ α− α.
For each agent ν ∈ N , let sν > 0 be ν’s skill level. If L > 0 is the amount of time
each agent is endowed with, then ν’s effective labour endowment is lν = sνL.13 Similarly, if
11Formally, α = (−αl,−α,α) with αl ∈ R+, α ∈ RM+ , and α ∈ RM+ .
12Formally, P is a closed, convex cone with 0 = (0, ..., 0) ∈ P . This assumption is standard in the literature
and it is appropriate if all factors of production are accounted for.
13Although we allow for different skills, we are implicitly ruling out different types of labour used in
production. This is only for simplicity and all of the key insights of the paper can be extended to economies
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λν is the amount of time spent by ν in production, then Λν = sνλν is the effective labour




ν be the vector of social endowments. Let p, w, and r, denote, respectively,
the vector of the prices of produced commodities, the wage rate, and the rate of return on
capital.
Each economy has a list
¡N ,M, P, (ων)ν∈N , (lν)ν∈N¢. Given this list, a vector z ≡
(x,Λ) ∈ RNM+N+ represents an allocation x = (xν)ν∈N of the M commodities to the N
agents in the economy and a profile Λ = (Λν)ν∈N of (effective) labour supplied by each
agent. This vector is called an economically feasible allocation at prices (p,w, r) if and only
if there exists a production activity α ∈ P satisfying α 5 ω, bα =Pν∈N xν, αl =Pν∈N Λν ,
0 5 Λν 5 lν , and pxν = wΛν + rpων for each agent ν ∈ N .14 In other words, an allocation is
economically feasible if the aggregate amount of each commodity allocated to agents can be
produced given the aggregate endowments of physical and human capital in the economy, and
each agent’s budget constraint is satisfied at the given prices.15 Denote the set of economically
feasible allocations at prices (p,w, r) by Z(p,w,r) ⊆ RNM+N+ . If xν is the commodity bundle
actually purchased by agent ν ∈ N at an allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r) then we shall denote it as
cν.
In this general economic environment, there is no obvious or widely shared definition
of UEL exploitation. For any bundle c ∈ RM+ , let l.v. (c) denote the minimum amount of
(effective) labour necessary to produce c as net output.16 In his classic definition, Morishima
[22] focuses on the bundle actually purchased by an agent, cν , and defines its labour content
as l.v. (cν ):
with different labour inputs. For a discussion see Veneziani and Yoshihara [45].
14The notation for vector inequalities is: for all y, y0 ∈ Rp, y = y0 if and only if yi = y0i for all i; y ≥ y0 if
and only if y = y0 and y 6= y0; y > y0 if and only if yi > y0i for all i.
15As noted by an anonymous referee, the model is not very realistic in that it does not explicitly account
for public goods. This might be a shortcoming, if we intended to provide a comprehensive description of
exploitative relations in actual capitalist economies. Our aim here is different, though: ours is a normative
analysis of the concept of UEL exploitation that aims to identify the intuitions shared by all of the main
approaches. For this purpose, and as a first step towards a more complete analysis, it is appropriate to
adopt the same model used in the literature and neglect the complications arising from public goods. (For
a pioneering discussion of exploitation in economies with public goods, see Fleurbaey [13].)
16Formally, l.v. (c) ≡ min {αl | α ∈ P, bα = c}.
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Definition 1 (Morishima [22]): At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), agent ν ∈ N , who supplies
Λν and purchases cν , is exploited if and only if Λν > l.v. (cν ) and an exploiter if and only if
Λν < l.v. (cν ).
Definition 1 has some desirable characteristics, according to Morishima ([22], pp.616-618):
the notion of exploitation is well-defined because, under mild assumptions on technology,
l.v. (c) is unique, well-defined and positive whenever c 6= (0, ..., 0) and exploitation status
is determined prior to and independent of price information, as in the standard Marxian
approach, focusing only on production data.
According to Roemer ([29], p.152), however, Definition 1 is conceptually flawed because
it embodies a merely technological concept of value and is independent of the social relations
of production, as it identifies exploitation status based on production techniques that may
never be used by profit-maximising capitalists. Like Morishima [22], Roemer [29] focuses
on the bundle actually bought by agents, cν, but argues that its labour content should
be determined focusing on profit-rate-maximising activities, for only the latter production
processes will be activated in a capitalist economy.
Let an allocation z = (Λ,x) ∈ Z(p,w,r) with a price vector (p, w, r) be an equilibrium
allocation whenever for any ν ∈ N , (xν,Λν) is preferred by ν to any other (x0ν,Λ0ν) satisfying
x0ν ∈ RM+ , 0 5 Λ0ν 5 lν , and px0ν = wΛ0ν+rpων .17 For any bundle c ∈ RM+ , let l.v. (c; p, w, r)
be the minimum amount of (effective) labour necessary to produce c as net output with a
profit-rate-maximising activity at given equilibrium prices.18 Then:
Definition 2 (Roemer [29], chapter 5): Consider an equilibrium allocation z with prices
(p,w, r). Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies Λν and purchases cν , is exploited if and only if Λν >
l.v. (cν ; p, w, r) and an exploiter if and only if Λν < l.v. (cν ; p,w, r).
While individual consumption choices are central in Definition 2, Roemer [29] has also
proposed an alternative approach in which agents’ exploitation status is independent of their
17An equilibrium allocation is essentially a Reproducible solution as defined by Roemer ([29], pp.64, 114).
A thorough discussion of this notion goes beyond the boundaries of this paper. Intuitively, a reproducible
solution involves individual optimisation, nonnegative aggregate excess demand in all markets of produced
goods, and market clearing in the labour and/or credit market.
18Formally, let Pπ (p,w, r) ≡
n
α ∈ P | pα−rpα−wαlpα = maxα0∈P pα0−rpα0−wα0lpα0
o
be the set of activities that
maximise the rate of return on capital at (p,w, r). Then, l.v. (c; p,w, r) ≡ min {αl | α ∈ Pπ (p,w, r), bα = c}.
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preferences over bundles of produced goods, focusing on the maximum and the minimum
amounts of labour embodied in bundles that they can purchase. For all ν ∈ N and all
Λν 5 lν, let B(ων ,Λν; p, w, r) be the set of consumption bundles that agent ν can purchase
at prices (p,w, r), if she supplies Λν units of labour, given her endowment ων .19 Then:
Definition 3 (Roemer [29], chapter 5): Consider an equilibrium allocation z with prices
(p,w, r). Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies Λν and possesses ων is exploited if and only if Λν >
maxcν∈B(ων ,Λν ;p,w,r) l.v. (cν ; p,w, r) and an exploiter if and only if Λν < mincν∈B(ων ,Λν ;p,w,r) l.v. (cν ; p, w, r).
Although they preserve many standard insights of exploitation theory, Definitions 1-
3 have been criticised because exploitation status depends on counterfactual amounts of
labour, as the production activities yielding l.v. (cν ) or l.v. (cν ; p, w, r) may be different from
those actually used (Flaschel [10, 11]). According to critics, this use of counterfactuals
is theoretically undesirable and makes exploitation an empirically vacuous notion, since the
computation of l.v. (cν ) and l.v. (cν ; p, w, r) requires information that is not available, includ-
ing, in Morishima’s ([22], p.617) own words, “information about all the available techniques
of production, actually chosen or potentially usable”.
The last definition considered here is an extension of the so-called ‘New Interpretation’
(Duménil [5]; Foley [14]).20 Let αp,w,r ∈ P be the aggregate (profit-rate-maximising) produc-
tion activity at an equilibrium allocation z with prices (p,w, r). Definition 4 identifies the
labour associated with, or contained in any nonnegative bundle of goods.
Definition 4 : Consider any equilibrium allocation z with prices (p,w, r) and associated
αp,w,r. For each c ∈ RM+ with pc 5 pbαp,w,r, let τ c ∈ [0, 1] be such that τ cpbαp,w,r = pc. The
labour content of c at z is τ cαp,w,rl .
By Definition 4, the labour content of aggregate net output, bαp,w,r, is equal to total social
labour, αp,w,rl , and for any bundle c whose value does not exceed national income pbαp,w,r,
the labour contained in c is equal to the fraction τ c of social labour necessary to produce a
fraction of aggregate net output, τ cbαp,w,r, that has the same value as c.21 As in Roemer’s
[29] approach, in Definition 4 the labour content of a bundle can be identified only if the
19Formally: B(ων ,Λν ; p,w, r) ≡ ©cν ∈ RM+ | pcν 5 wΛν + rpωνª.
20See Yoshihara and Veneziani [52]; Yoshihara [50]; Veneziani and Yoshihara [44, 45]
21If pbαp,w,r = 0, then τ c = 0 by definition.
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price vector is known. Yet social relations play a more central role, because the definition of
labour content requires a prior knowledge of social production αp,w,r and labour content is
explicitly linked to the redistribution of total social labour. Then:
Definition 5 (New Interpretation): Consider any equilibrium allocation z with prices (p,w, r)
and associated αp,w,r. For any ν ∈ N , who supplies Λν and purchases cν , let τ cν be defined
as in Definition 4. Agent ν is exploited if and only if Λν > τ c
ν
αp,w,rl and an exploiter if and
only if Λν < τ c
ν
αp,w,rl .
In other words, for any agent ν ∈ N , τ cν represents ν’s share of national income, and so
τ c
ν
αp,w,rl is the share of social labour that ν receives by earning income barely sufficient to buy
cν . Thus, in the New Interpretation, the notion of exploitation is related to the production
and distribution of national income and social labour, and depends on empirically observable
magnitudes. Yet, Definition 5 has been criticised because, unlike Definitions 1 and 2, the
actual bundles purchased by agents are only indirectly relevant to determine exploitation
status, and unlike Definition 1, the notion of exploitation depends on price information.
In summary, our brief, and admittedly partial review shows that various definitions can
be, and have in fact been, proposed which incorporate very different normative and positive
intuitions. In the next sections, we show that in spite of these differences there exists a
common core defining UEL theory.
4 Unequal exchange of labour: foundations
In this section, and the next, we identify the foundations of UEL exploitation theory that are
shared by all of the main approaches. Our purpose is not to discriminate among competing
views, but rather to define the theoretical boundaries of UEL theory. Formally, we aim to
identify a general domain for all admissible UEL exploitation forms.
Let N ter, N ted,N n be three subsets of the set of agents N denoting, respectively, the
set of exploiters, the set of exploited agents, and the set of agents that are neither exploited
nor exploiters. At the most general level, a definition of exploitation can be interpreted as a
rule that identifies the sets N ter, N ted,N n at each feasible allocation - that is, as a mapping
from Z(p,w,r) to the power set of N .
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The first axiom of UEL theory requires that a definition of exploitation unambiguously
identifies the exploitation status of every agent at any feasible economic allocation.
Axiom 1 (The exploitation partition) At any feasible allocation, any definition of exploita-
tion identifies a partition of the set of agents. Formally, at any z ∈ Z(p,w,r), the sets N ter,
N ted,N n are pairwise disjoint and N ter∪ N ted ∪N n = N .
According to Axiom 1, even though exploitation may be a property of aggregates, such
as social classes (or nations, see Roemer [29], chapter 1), such aggregates are ultimately
made of individuals with a well-defined exploitation status. Axiom 1 thus excludes radically
holistic approaches, which identify the existence of exploitation only at the aggregate level,
without any reference to (coalitions of) individuals. It does not rule out approaches viewing
“exploitation as a social phenomenon, and the existence of exploitation need not imply,
in principle, the existence of individual exploiters or exploited” (Roemer [29], p.136). But
it does require the exploitation status of each agent to be clearly defined: at any feasible
allocation, for every agent ν ∈ N , either ν ∈ N ter and ν is an exploiter; or ν ∈ N ted and ν
is exploited; or ν ∈ N n and ν is exploitation-neutral.22
Axiom 1 defines exploitation as a property, not primarily as a relation (Elster [7], p.174).
It requires exploitation status to be defined at an overall allocation, and is silent about
exploitation in individual transactions (unlike in approaches focusing on just acquisition,
such as Steiner [41], or disadvantage, such as Goodin [15] and Sample [36]). This does not
exclude the possibility that exploitation be diagnosed relationally, at the level of individual
transactions, and agents may be exploited in some transactions, and exploiters in others
(e.g., Fleurbaey [13], p.661). According to Axiom 1, however, the agents’ overall exploitation
status should also be identified taking into account all of their economic activities.23
In principle, Axiom 1 may apply to any definitions of exploitation, including those fo-
cusing on fair pricing (e.g., Robinson [27] and Reiff [25]) or property relations (e.g. Roemer
[29], chapter 7). In UEL theory, however, at any allocation, the exploitation status of an
22Axiom 1 rules out the possibility of incommensurable dimensions, or ‘spheres’, of exploitation: agents
can be exploiters in one dimension and exploited in a different dimension, but their overall exploitation
status must be well-defined.
23The fact that, from a positive viewpoint, the overall exploitation status depends on the outcome of
many transactions does not imply that exploitation status can, or should be defined at the level of individual
transactions in a normatively relevant way.
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agent ν is identified by comparing the labour that ν ‘gives’, in some relevant sense, and the
labour that ν ‘receives’, in some relevant sense. Thus, in any UEL approach, two variables
must be specified for each agent: the labour given and the labour received. As a shorthand
notation, let LνG and L
ν
R denote, respectively, the labour ‘given’ and the labour ‘received’ by
agent ν ∈ N at allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r). Our task is to identify the restrictions on LνG and LνR
common to all UEL approaches.
In all UEL approaches, the labour ‘given’ by agent ν is just a scalar. In simple economies
with homogeneous labour, it is equal to the labour time expended by ν in production.24
In more general settings, however, various definitions can be adopted, which incorporate
different normative intuitions. In order to focus on the core of UEL exploitation theory
shared by all approaches, we leave LνG unspecified while assuming that it is a scalar for all
ν ∈ N . We return to this issue in section 7 below.
The definition of the labour that each agent ‘receives’ is more controversial, and many
different proposals can be (and have been) made, as shown in section 3. The labour ‘received’
by an agent at an allocation is not necessarily captured by a single number (see, for example,
Definition 3) and each LνR could be a (possibly infinite) set of labour amounts related, for
example, to an agent’s budget set. In all UEL approaches, however, exploitation status is
monotonic in the sense that for an agent to be classified as exploited, she must ‘give’ more
labour - have a higher LνG - than it would be necessary to classify her as an exploiter, every-
thing else equal (that is, for given consumption, income, preferences, and so on). Therefore
we submit that in UEL theory, at any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), the exploitation status of each
agent ν can be defined by identifying at most two cut-off values Lνmin, L
ν
max which may be
interpreted as the upper and lower bounds of the labour ‘received’ by ν, and can be called
the reference labour amounts.25
The next axiom defines the core of the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of
labour.
24Some UEL approaches - such as Emmanuel’s [9] classic analysis of international inequalities - focus
exclusively on the sphere of exchange and define LνG and L
ν
R as the labour embodied in the bundles that
agents give up and receive in exchange, respectively. Although our axiomatic framework also encompasses
these approaches, we shall not analyse them in detail because they focus mostly on international relations
and, more importantly, their normative foundations are unclear (see Roemer [29] and Schweickart [37]).
25That is, for any z ∈ Z(p,w,r), either LνR ∈ [Lνmin, Lνmax] or LνR ⊆ [Lνmin, Lνmax] holds.
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Axiom 2 (UEL exploitation) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for all ν ∈ N , there exist
LνG ∈ R and Lνmin, Lνmax ∈ R with Lνmin 5 Lνmax such that agent ν is an exploiter if and only
if LνG < L
ν





Axiom 2 incorporates an “idea of exploitation, as a certain kind of lack of reciprocity”
(Cohen [3], p.343), whereby an agent is exploited whenever “the labor he contributes in one
form does not return to him in another form” (Husami [18], p.44). The lack of reciprocity may
be normatively relevant per se,26 or because differences in labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ reflect
normatively significant inequalities. Axiom 2 holds in approaches that define exploitation as
the (forced) extraction of surplus, or unpaid labour (Holmstrom [17]; Elster [8]; Reiman [26]),
but it is more general than that and it does not imply a commitment to an objective theory of
value. For the labour ‘given’ and ‘received’ by agents need not be determined objectively, and
may reflect agents’ preferences and beliefs. Indeed, Axiom 2 does not imply a commitment
to any theory of value, or to the claim that labour is the only thing that produces value.27
It only identifies labour as the key normative variable of interest - the main unit of account
of exploitation theory - and thus rules out approaches based on wealth, income, utility, and
so on. In exploitation theory, labour accounting is the “way of characterizing what it is that
people give one another ... (where ‘give’ is understood very broadly to refer to any way in
which some person undergoes a loss that ends up a gain to another)” (Reiman [26], p.9).28
Axiom 2 provides a general statement of the basic principle of UEL theory. In order to
have an operational definition, however, and setting aside for the moment the definition of
LνG, it is necessary to identify the labour ‘received’ by agents. This is by no means trivial. For
there are potentially up to 2N reference labour amounts at any allocation. So the question
26“The capitalist gets something for nothing, or much for little, at the expense of others” (Elster [8], p.39).
More generally, UEL exploitation may reflect a deviation from some fair reference norm in exchange (Fleur-
baey [13], p.666). According to Arneson ([1], p.213), “Exploitation is one important form of mistreatment.
To be exploited is roughly to be forced to perform drudgery to an unfairly great extent, and to receive in
return an unfairly small share of goods” (as measured in the labour numéraire).
27See, for example, Buchanan ([2], p.46); Roemer ([31], p.62); Cohen ([3], ch.11); Fleurbaey ([12], p.181;
[13], p.654); Vrousalis ([47], p.138).
28According to Sen ([38], p.177), labour accounting is meant to provide “a description of production that
focuse[s] on human beings” and the foundations of a normative approach whereby “personal participation
can be seen as the basis of entitlement of fruits of production.” For an alternative justification of labour
accounting in exploitation theory, see Roemer ([29], pp.283-288).
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is; how are (Lνmin, L
ν
max)ν∈N determined? Or, equivalently, how do agents ‘receive’ labour?
As Roemer ([31], p.31) puts it, “exploitation theory views goods as vessels of labor, and
calculates labor accounts for people by comparing the ‘live’ labor they expend in production
with the ‘dead’ labor they get back in the vessels.” Axiom 3 formalises this view and states
that agents receive labour via certain commodity bundles.
Axiom 3 (Exploitation reference bundles, ERBs) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for each
ν ∈ N , there exist cνmin, cνmax ∈ RM+ and a function f ν such that Lνmin = fν(cνmin) and
Lνmax = f
ν(cνmax).
Axiom 3 implies that, for each agent ν, the reference labour amounts, Lνmin, L
ν
max, can
be interpreted as the amounts of labour associated with, or contained in some theoretically
relevant reference commodity bundles, the ERBs. In the standard approach outlined in
section 2, the labour received by workers is equal to the labour embodied in the goods
required for their subsistence: cνmin, c
ν
max are equal and coincide with a given subsistence
basket, and the labour associated with them, f ν, is computed by identifying employment
multipliers which uniquely identify the unit labour embodied in each commodity, and a
fortiori in any bundles of goods.29 Axiom 3 is more general, as it allows cνmin, c
ν
max to be
different and unrelated to any subsistence notion (or indeed to agents’ consumption choices)
and it does not require the adoption of the standard notion of labour embodied. Indeed,
it does not require a general theory for the determination of the labour contained in any
bundles of goods: it only states that any definition of UEL exploitation should have a well-
defined (albeit possibly implicit) notion of labour associated with, or contained in, the ERBs.
Thus, Axiom 3 also captures the intuitions of approaches that do not focus on the labour
embodied in given consumption bundles, such as the ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [5]; Foley
[14]), according to which the labour ‘received’ by agents is equivalent to the amount of social
labour agents receive a claim to via their income.







agent ν and each (cνmin, c
ν
max), f
ν is a purely normative (and possibly agent-specific) construct
that identifies the labour ‘received’ by ν based on some reference bundles. Axiom 3 does
not specify how fν translates the ERBs into amounts of labour, as its properties are left
29For a discussion in general n-good economies, see Morishima [21, 22]; Flaschel [10, 11].
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unspecified. Some theoretically relevant restrictions on f ν, and on the choice of the ERBs
(cνmin, c
ν
max), are identified in the next section.
5 The exploitation reference bundles
Axioms 1-3 are not a complete theory of exploitation. They provide a rigorous framework
to conceptualise UEL exploitation, and the theoretical choices of different approaches, in
terms of restrictions on (LνG, L
ν
R)ν∈N . Concerning L
ν
R, Axiom 3 implies that in order to
define the exploitation status of each agent, it is necessary both to select the relevant ERBs,
cνmin, c
ν
max, and to identify their labour content - that is, the (possibly implicit) function f
ν
that associates a reference labour amount with each ERB. In this section, we explore some
restrictions on cνmin, c
ν
max and f
ν that aim to incorporate formally weak, theoretically robust,
and widely shared intuitions in UEL theory.
Axiom 4 requires cνmin, c
ν
max to be in the set of economically feasible choices for agent ν.
Axiom 4 (Economic feasibility) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), cνmin, cνmax ∈ B(ων , lν ; p, w, r)
for all ν ∈ N .
Axiom 4 stipulates that the ERBs be at least potentially affordable (recall that lν is
agent ν’s labour endowment). By focusing on potential, rather than actual income, it allows
for many different views: the ERBs may coincide with the bundle actually purchased by
agents, or they may be some normatively relevant commodity bundles that are actually or
only potentially affordable.30 The former approach is relevant if one believes that the ERBs
should be related to agents’ actual consumption choices, because the way in which revenues
are actually allocated (e.g. between consumption and investment) may be relevant to the
moral status of their distribution (e.g. Elster [7], p.177). The latter approach is important,
for example, in modal definitions in which exploitation status cannot be established just by
looking at actual behaviour (Elster [7], pp.173ff)
Thus, Axiom 4 holds in UEL approaches that take the ERB to be unique and equal to the
workers’ subsistence basket.31 But it also holds in approaches that abandon a subsistence
30Yet, Axiom 4 incorporates an emphasis on current economic data - and specifically current endowments
- that contradicts approaches focusing on historical injustice, such as Steiner’s [41].
31Indeed, the weak notion of economic feasibility formalised in Axiom 4 is (implicitly) endorsed even
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view and define the labour received by worker ν focusing on “commodities whose value is
equivalent to the wages [ν] receives” (Buchanan [2], p.37; see also Morishima [21], p.46); or
even more generally, in those approaches that determine the labour received by any agent by
looking at the amount of labour contained “in the goods he can purchase with his revenues
from production (which may come from wages, profits, or the sale of commodities)” (Roemer
[32], p.90).
Axiom 4 imposes an economic feasibility condition on the ERBs. Following classic UEL
theory, Axiom 5 requires that cνmin, c
ν
max be also technologically feasible as net output of some
production process.
Axiom 5 (Technical feasibility) At any feasible allocation, for all ν ∈ N there exist tech-
nically feasible activities that can produce cνmin, c
ν
max as net output. Formally, at any z ∈
Z(p,w,r), for all ν ∈ N , there exist α0ν, α00ν ∈ P such that bα0ν = cνmin and bα00ν = cνmax.
The emphasis on production conditions is standard in the traditional Marxist view ac-
cording to which the amount of labour received by workers is equal to the value of labour
power. Because labour power is a produced commodity, its value is given by the amount
of labour necessary to produce it, which is identical with the amount of time required to
produce the means of subsistence of the worker. More generally, in UEL theory, exploitation
is a specific wrong rooted in the sphere of production (Cohen [3], p.345; Elster [7], p.167;
Fleurbaey [12], p.184), and formal UEL definitions “map from the fundamental relations of
production into the labour market and from this to the market of commodities, and then
invert the mapping so as to go from the market of the final goods back to the production
relationship” (Morishima and Catephores [23], p.43).
Axiom 5 requires the ERBs to be technically feasible as net output of some production
process.32 This is because the direct labour used to produce a bundle c as net output allows
one to capture the total amount of labour - direct and indirect - contained in producing c
from scratch. A focus on net output is also natural in those UEL approaches that define
embodied labour such that total labour performed in the economy in a given period is equal
in approaches that deny the relevance of income distribution in exploitation theory, while focusing on the
concept of necessary labour (e.g., Holmstrom [17], pp.360ff).
32Axiom 5 may be considered as a strong requirement if each agent has different bundles cνmin, c
ν
max. Yet
it is easily satisfied for realistic choices of cνmin, c
ν
max, or if the set P possesses some standard properties (such
as free disposal; see Veneziani and Yoshihara [44]).
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to the labour contained in net national product, and conceive of exploitation as measuring
(using a labour metric) how net national product is parcelled out to individuals.33
While Axioms 4 and 5 impose restrictions on the ERBs, the next two properties focus
on the function f ν that associates a reference amount of labour to each ERB. Let s =¡
s1, ..., sN
¢
. Axiom 6 is a natural complement to Axiom 5 in that it requires that the
reference labour amounts also be related to production conditions.





ν(cνmax) depend on the amount of labour necessary to produce
cνmin, c
ν
max. Formally, for any z ∈ Z(p,w,r) and each ν ∈ N , there exist ανmin, ανmax ∈ P and
a positive scalar κν (P, s) such that bανmin = cνmin, bανmax = cνmax, Lνmin = κν (P, s)ανlmin, and
Lνmax = κ
ν (P, s)ανlmax.
The notion of labour contained adopted in Axiom 6 is by no means metaphysical and
bears no conceptual relation with the disputes on the labour theory of value. The labour
contained in the ERBs is a well-defined amount related to current technical conditions,34 and
to the direct amount of (effective) labour used in production. Contra Steedman [40], Axiom
6 rules out negative reference labour amounts, because the labour contained in the ERBs,
and thus the labour received by agents should be non-negative by definition (Morishima and
Catephores [23], p.32; Flaschel [11], p.18).
According to Axiom 6, the reference labour amounts may be quantities of effective labour,
but this is not a requirement: for each ν ∈ N , the positive scalar κν (P, s) is meant to linearly
transform effective labour units into units of labour, and different specifications of the linear
transformations (κν (P, s))ν∈N correspond to different notions of the labour ‘received’ (as
well as ‘given’) by agents. That is, the appropriate choice of (κν (P, s))ν∈N may depend on
the normative use of the concept of exploitation (Fleurbaey [12], pp.176-177). We return to
this issue in section 7 below.
A focus on production and on the notion of labour contained in the ERBs may seem
restrictive in that it rules out, for example, approaches focusing on exchange whereby the
reference labour amounts are determined based on labour commanded - that is, on the
33For example, Flaschel [10, 11]; Duménil [5]; Foley [14]; and Fleurbaey ([12], p.171). See also the discussion
in Morishima and Catephores ([23], pp.42-43) and Roemer ([31], pp.30-31).
34Rather than labour actually used in the past to produce a certain bundle of goods (Cohen [3], pp.346ff).
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amount of labour power that an agent may purchase with her income. This should not
be a major concern. Considerations of purchasing power enter our framework explicitly in
Axiom 4. Further, Axiom 6 allows for the possibility that price magnitudes and market
relations enter the definition of labour contained in the ERBs, and although it does impose
some restrictions on fν , they are extremely weak and the choice of reference labour amounts
remains significantly open, as there may be very many ways of producing the ERBs.35
Given that our aim is to identify the foundations of UEL theory shared by all of the
main approaches, there is no reason to impose any strong restrictions on fν . Different
restrictions may appropriately reflect alternative views, or may be desirable in different
economic environments.36 Yet, a common assumption in the UEL literature is that, however
determined, the reference labour amounts be well-defined and unique.
















According to Axiom 7, if the ERBs of two agents are equal, then the associated reference
labour amounts should be the same: the labour contained in the ERBs should be uniquely
identified based on production conditions and not on idiosyncratic subjective factors. Al-
though there are many conceivable ways of determining Lνmin and L
ν
max, Axiom 7 states
that such differences should be at the level of the theory, and not of arbitrary individual
characteristics. This does not imply that subjective preferences and individual choices are
irrelevant in determining exploitation status. It only means that the labour contained in the
ERBs should not depend on the identity of the agents’ receiving them.37
Axiom 7 holds in the standard Marxian approach, whereby the labour content of a
bundle, however defined, is uniquely determined and exploitation status is independent of
35If the production set P satisfies a standard free disposal condition, then for any c ∈ RM+ , there may be
an uncountably infinite number of production activities that produce c as net output.
36As discussed in section 3, for example, some authors insist that reference labour amounts be determined
based on the production techniques actually used, while others allow for counterfactual techniques.
37Thus, Axiom 7 does not imply, for example, that agents consuming the same bundle must receive the
same amount of labour regardless of any other potentially relevant information (concerning, for example,
the source of their income). Rather, it says that normatively relevant differences between agents at a given
allocation should be reflected in the choice of the ERBs (which, as we have noted, do not necessarily coincide
with actual consumption bundles), and not in the determination of the labour associated with them.
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agents’ subjective characteristics. According to Morishima ([21], p.181), for example, a
fundamental property of a definition of exploitation is that “each worker has to be shown to
be equally exploited by the capitalists.” Yet, Axiom 7 seems reasonable also more generally
and it is widely shared in UEL approaches: as argued by Yoshihara and Veneziani [53], one
of the essential, if not defining characteristics of exploitation as a normative construct in
political philosophy is its (weakly) objectivist thrust. “If an agent could change from being
exploited into being an exploiter simply as a result of a change of tastes, some of the moral
connotations of exploitation would be lost” (Elster [7], p.174; see also Roemer [29], p.110).
Axiom 7 seems the weakest, and most easily defensible, part of a general objectivist theory
of UEL exploitation. For if labour is ‘received’ via some commodity bundles, then it seems
natural to require that a single reference labour amount be associated with any ERB.
Axioms 4-7 complete the analysis of the basic structure of UEL approaches. In UEL
theory, the exploitation status of an agent ν is characterised by the labour ‘given’ and
‘received’ by her. The labour received by ν is determined by identifying some relevant
commodity bundles, the ERBs, which are potentially affordable (Axiom 4) and technically
feasible (Axiom 5), and the labour contained in them, which is (a linear transformation of)
the amount of labour necessary to produce them (Axiom 6), and is uniquely determined
independently of subjective factors (Axiom 7).
6 Labour exploitation
Axioms 1-7 define the common structure underlying different approaches to UEL theory.
In this section, we formalise a domain condition, called Labour Exploitation: it summarises
Axioms 1-7 and so, we argue, identifies the domain of admissible exploitation forms.38
Labour Exploitation (LE):Given any definition of exploitation, the sets N ted,N ter should
have the following property. At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r) with a price system (p, w, r), there
exist a nonnegative vector (LνG)ν∈N , a positive vector (κ
ν (P, s))ν∈N , a profile of commodity
bundles (cνmin, c
ν




max)ν∈N that satisfy production
objectivism such that for each agent ν ∈ N : cνmin, cνmax ∈ B(ων, lν ; p,w, r), ανmin,ανmax ∈ P
38LE generalises similar axioms analysed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [52], Yoshihara [50], and Veneziani
and Yoshihara [44, 45, 46].
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with bανmin = cνmin, bανmax = cνmax, and ανlmax = ανlmin, and
ν ∈ N ted if and only if κν (P, s)ανlmax < LνG,
ν ∈ N ter if and only if κν (P, s)ανlmin > LνG.
According to LE, at any feasible allocation, the exploitation status of every agent ν is
determined by the difference between the labour that ν ‘gives’ to the economy, and the
labour she ‘receives’. Whereas the former quantity is left unspecified, the labour received by
ν is determined by identifying at most two (potentially) affordable and technically feasible
bundles, cνmin, c
ν
max, and their labour content which is equal to (a linear transformation of) the
labour necessary to produce them as net output, κν (P, s)ανlmin, κ
ν (P, s)ανlmax. The amount
of labour that ν receives is the (possibly degenerate) interval [κν (P, s)ανlmin,κ
ν (P, s)ανlmax],
and so, for any ν ∈ N , if LνG is more (resp., less) than κν (P, s)ανlmax (resp., κν (P, s)ανlmin)
then ν is regarded as ‘giving’ more (resp., less) labour than ν ‘receives’ and therefore a
member of N ted (resp., N ter).
The domain condition LE summarises the content of Axioms 1-7. Indeed, the next result
proves that LE is logically equivalent to them.39
Theorem 1. At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), a definition of exploitation satisfies LE if and
only if it satisfies Axioms 1-7.
In the previous sections, we have argued that Axioms 1-7 describe the structure and the
fundamental intuitions common to all of the main approaches in UEL theory. Then, by
Theorem 1, LE also captures the key intuitions of UEL theory. In order to substantiate this
claim, we now show that in spite of all the differences highlighted in section 3, all of the
main definitions in the literature satisfy LE, and thus Axioms 1-7.
To see this, note that in all of the approaches examined in section 3, at all z ∈ Z(p,w,r),
LνG = Λ
ν and κν (P, s) = 1, for all ν ∈ N . In Definitions 1 and 2, at all z ∈ Z(p,w,r), the ERB
is unique and corresponds to the bundle actually purchased by agents, cνmin = c
ν
max ≡ cν ∈
B (ων, lν ; p,w, r), for all ν ∈ N . However, in Definition 1, the labour content of the ERB is
the minimum amount of labour necessary to produce it among all conceivable production
39We state the equivalence between LE and Axioms 1-7 as a formal Theorem, because this precisely defines
the relationship between the domain axiom and our characterisation of UE theory and it clearly decomposes
the elements of LE. Because LE summarises Axioms 1-7, however, the proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward.
We enclose it in the Appendix for completeness.
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activities, whereas in Definition 2 only profit rate maximising processes are considered.40 In
Definition 3, given an equilibrium allocation z with prices (p,w, r), using the same notion of
labour content as in Definition 2, cνmax is the bundle whose labour content is maximal among
all the bundles that the agent can purchase at (p,w, r), while cνmin is the bundle whose
corresponding labour content is minimal.41 Note that, in general, cνmin 6= cνmax 6= cν under
Definition 3. Finally, in Definition 5, given an equilibrium allocation z with prices (p, w, r)
and aggregate profit-rate-maximising production activity αp,w,r, the ERB is unique but, for
all ν ∈ N , it is defined counterfactually as the proportion of net aggregate output that the









pαp,w,r , and its labour content is given by the corresponding share of aggregate social
labour, α
cνe
l ≡ τ c
ν
αp,w,rl .
Similarly, it is possible - albeit notationally intensive - to show that other definitions
satisfy LE, including the input-output approach proposed by Flaschel [10, 11]; the variant of
Definition 2 that focuses on any activities in P π(p, w, r) such that bα = c, and not only labour-
minimising ones (Roemer [29], pp.164-168); and even the subjectivist approach developed
by Matsuo [20], according to which the labour received by an agent who consumes a bundle
c corresponds to the minimum amount of labour necessary to produce another bundle c0 as
net output, which gives at least as much utility as c.
This confirms that LE incorporates the main insights of UEL exploitation theory shared
by all of the main approaches.
7 Ethical restrictions
Despite the seemingly irreconcilable differences between definitions focusing on physical or
monetary magnitudes, actual choices or potential consumption, objective data or subjec-
tive preferences, actual or counterfactual production processes, and so on, Axioms 1-7, and
therefore LE, identify a fundamental structure that defines UEL exploitation theory in all of
40Formally: in Definition 1, ανmin = α
ν
max = α




cν ∈ argmin {αl | α ∈ Pπ (p,w, r), bα = cν}. Correspondingly, the labour content speci-
fied in Definition 1 is αc
ν
l = l.v. (c
ν ), while in Definition 2 it is αc
ν
l = l.v. (c
ν ; p,w, r).
41Formally: in Definition 3, the ERBs are cνmax ≡ argmaxcν∈B(ων ,Λν ;p,w,r) l.v. (cν ; p,w, r) and cνmin ≡
argmincν∈B(ων ,Λν ;p,w,r) l.v. (cν ; p,w, r), and their labour contents are l.v. (cνmax; p,w, r) and l.v. (cνmin; p,w, r),
respectively.
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its variants - even though this structure, and the notions of ERBs and their labour content
are usually left implicit. Hence they can be interpreted as defining the boundaries of the
admissible class of UEL exploitation forms.
Of course, the boundaries of UEL theory delineated by Axioms 1-7 are extremely wide
and potentially include an infinite number of conceivable definitions - i.e. an infinite number
of ways of specifying the ERBs, the reference labour amounts, and LνG. It is therefore
natural to ask how our framework could be extended to determine exploitation status within
a (possibly core) class of definitions. To be precise, can one identify additional restrictions on
the definitions of labour given and labour received that characterise a core class of approches
within the admissible set defined by LE?
In this section, we show that, by identifying the common foundations of UEL theory, LE
also provides the formal and conceptual framework to answer this question and to examine
the normative and positive implications of different approaches. We illustrate this point by
showing how the differences between alternative definitions can be conceived of as different
additional ethical restrictions imposed on LE. We return to the more general issue of the
possible extensions of our approach in the Conclusions.
A first important issue concerns the relevance of individual choices in determining ex-
ploitation status. In LE, the labour received by agent ν is determined by some reference
bundles that ν can in principle purchase. In Definitions 1 and 2, however, the ERB should
be the bundle cν actually chosen by agent ν at allocation z. Formally:
Axiom 8 (Consumer subjectivism) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), cνmin = cνmax = cν for all
agents ν ∈ N .
The theoretical justification for Axiom 8 rests on the idea that disregarding agents’ con-
sumption choices implies identifying their exploitation status based on information that is
potentially at odds with their actual situation and well-being.
This subjectivist view is not uncontroversial. Following the standard Marxian approach,
for example, one may insist that exploitation status depend on production decisions, and not
on possibly idiosyncratic consumer choices. This intuition can be formalised as follows:
Axiom 9 (Consumer objectivism) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for any two agents ν,μ ∈
N , if B(ων , lν; p, w, r) = B(ωμ, lμ; p,w, r) then cνmin = cμmin and cνmax = cμmax.
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Axiom 9 is called ‘Consumer objectivism’ because it does not rule out the possibility that
subjective factors matter in other aspects of UEL theory - for example, by defining LνG as the
agents’ actual labour supply or even by introducing subjective elements in the determination
of the labour ‘content’ of the ERBs.
A second question concerns the kind of production processes that are normatively rel-
evant to identify exploitation status. LE requires that both the ERBs and their labour
content be determined with reference to production, but otherwise imposes no restrictions.
In UEL approaches, however, it is often required that only efficient production processes
be considered in order to determine exploitation status. Let ∂P denote the set of efficient
production activities.42 The next axiom states that the ERBs should be producible as net
output of efficient production activities.
Axiom 10 (The efficiency view) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for all ν ∈ N , αcνmin ∈ ∂P
and αc
ν
max ∈ ∂P with bαcνmin ≯ cνmin, bαcνmax ≯ cνmax.
The efficiency view is consistent with Marx’s emphasis on the notion of socially necessary
labour time and it embodies the idea that exploitative relations do not emerge from produc-
tive inefficiencies and mistakes. According to Morishima ([21], p.180), for example, in the
computation of labour amounts one should focus on “those techniques by the use of which
the amount of labour needed to produce given amounts of commodities can be minimized.”
From a normative viewpoint, these are the techniques that maximise the productivity of
human labour (ibid., p.184).43 From a positive viewpoint, one may argue that inefficient
techniques are at best a transient epiphenomenon in a competitive economy.
Yet, one may object that if the normative emphasis of UEL theory is on participation
in productive activities, then it is misleading to focus on possibly counterfactual processes,
and exploitation status should be identified based on production processes that are actually
activated in the economy (Flaschel [10, 11]). Let α ∈ P be the actual aggregate production
activity at a feasible allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r). One way to formalise this view is as follows.
42Formally: ∂P ≡ {α ∈ P | @α0 ∈ P such that α0 > α}.
43“[I]f the worker owned all the necessary means of production himself, all he would have to do would be to
work only the minimum amount of hours [necessary to produce his wage-goods]” (Morishima and Catephores
[23], p.41). See also Roemer ([28], p.38; [29], pp.168-173).
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Axiom 11 (The participation view) At any allocation z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for all ν ∈ N , there








Axiom 11 states that the reference labour amounts should be identified based on the
production processes actually activated in the economy — more precisely, they are equal to
some fraction of aggregate social labour performed. Thus, it incorporates the idea that
actual labour spent in production is what matters in defining exploitative relations because
it describes actual participation (Sen [38]).
So far, we have left LνG unspecified because there is no widely shared definition of the
labour ‘given’ by agents in economies with heterogeneous labour. In particular, two main
approaches can be distinguished which focus either on the effective labour contributed, or
on the labour time expended by agents. The former approach can be formalised as follows:
Axiom 12 (The contribution view) At any feasible allocation, the amount of labour that each
agent ‘gives’ is the effective labour that she contributes in economically relevant activities.
Formally, at any z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for all ν ∈ N , LνG = Λν and, correspondingly, κν (P, s) = 1.
By Axiom 12, both labour ‘given’ and labour ‘received’ are measured in terms of effective
labour. As noted in section 3, this is the natural extension of all of the classic definitions
of exploitation, and it is the approach adopted in much of the literature on exploitation
in economies with heterogeneous labour (see, e.g., Krause [19]; Duménil et al [6]). More-
over, the ‘contribution view ’ incorporates an important normative intuition: an efficient and
UEL exploitation-free allocation coincides with the proportional solution, a well-known fair
allocation rule whereby every agent’s income is proportional to her contribution to the econ-
omy (Roemer and Silvestre [35]). Proportionality is a strongly justified normative principle,
whose philosophical foundations can be traced back to Aristotle, and it can be justified in
terms of the Kantian categorical imperative (Roemer [34]).44
Alternatively, one may argue that UEL theory captures some inequalities in the distri-
bution of material well-being and free hours that are - at least prima facie - of normative
44The contribution principle (‘To each according to his contribution’) is also one of the principles of justice
analysed by Marx in the Critique of the Gotha programme (Husami [18]; Cohen [4]; Warren [48]).
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relevance (Fleurbaey [12, 13]).45 For example, they may be deemed relevant because material
well-being and free hours are key determinants of individual well-being freedom (Rawls [24];
Sen [39]). But they are also relevant in approaches that link exploitation and the Marxian
notion of alienation in production (Buchanan [2]). From this perspective, the key variable
of normative interest is labour time:46
Axiom 13 (The well-being view) At any feasible allocation, the amount of labour that each
agent ‘gives’ is the labour time that she spends in economically relevant activities. Formally,
at any z ∈ Z(p,w,r), for all ν ∈ N , LνG = λν.
Axiom 13 does not require that κν (P, s) = 1 for all agents ν, because the positive
vector (κν (P, s))ν∈N is necessary to transform units of effective labour into labour time, and
various theoretically relevant specifications are possible. For example, if (LνR)ν∈N captures
the distribution of social labour and ανmin,α
ν
max are the outcomes of social production activity,
then, for all ν ∈ N , κν (P, s) can be defined as the average skill level at allocation z:





ν . Alternatively, one may argue that LνR should be equal to the labour
time that would be necessary for each agent to produce the ERBs autarkically and set
κν (P, s) ≡ 1
sν
, for all ν ∈ N .
Axioms 8-9, 10-11, and 12-13 incorporate different normative intuitions and have rather
different implications, and in this paper we do not adjudicate them. The previous discussion
shows, however, that our domain axiom provides the formal and conceptual framework to
rigorously examine alternative approaches to exploitation theory and to identify a core class
of definitions of exploitation within the admissible set identified by LE.
8 Conclusions
This paper has laid out the foundations of UEL exploitation theory. We have identified its
basic conceptual structure, including the notions of exploitation reference bundles and the
45Cohen ([4], p.203) aptly refers to differences in the “leisure-and-income sets” available to agents. Roemer
([29], p.75 and passim) talks about the “exploitation-welfare criterion”.
46Axiom 13 holds also in the approach proposed by Arneson ([1], pp.212-3) whereby exploitative relations
violate the principle that “Those who make equal productive sacrifices are equally deserving of economic
remuneration”. Desert is measured against the time (and effort) spent in production, while discounting
natural abilities and skills as morally arbitrary. See also Elster ([7], p.202) and Reiman ([26], pp.9ff).
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labour associated with them, and formulated its core intuitions as a series of axioms. We
have shown that our analysis is descriptively accurate: all of the main approaches indeed
satisfy our axioms, or equivalently the domain condition LE. Finally, we have argued that
our analysis provides the framework to analyse the differences between alternative UEL
definitions, as well as the differences between UEL exploitation theory and other approaches.
To be sure, this descriptive exercise does not provide an answer to the issue of the norma-
tive relevance of UEL exploitation. Moreover, as a domain condition, LE does not represent a
full-fledged theory but a meta-property which identifies the object and space of research, and
some foundational properties defining the set of admissible definitions. Therefore, LE alone
cannot characterise a unique definition of exploitation, nor can it unambiguously identify
agents’ exploitation status at a given allocation. Yet, a clear statement of the foundations
of UEL theory represents a key step to tackle these issues.
On the one hand, Axioms 1-7, or equivalently LE, rigorously lay out the core normative
intuitions of UEL theory. According to LE, UEL exploitation is fundamentally a wrong in-
volving a kind of lack of reciprocity. As discussed in the explanation of Axiom 1, exploitation
is primarily a property, rather than a relation, which is diagnosed at the individual level and
at an overall economic allocation, rather than in individual transactions. Labour is the key
variable of normative interest and the main unit of account of UEL exploitation theory, and
the lack of reciprocity in exploitative relations is measured in terms of a mismatch between
the labour given and the labour received by agents. The former magnitude is measured
by the amount of labour spent, or contributed in productive activities, while agents receive
labour via bundles of goods that act as ‘vessels’ of labor. To be precise, agents receive labour
via bundles of goods that they can in principle purchase, given their productive endowments,
and that can be produced, given current technological knowledge. Thus, UEL exploitation
theory is different from standard liberal egalitarian approaches which focus on the distribu-
tion of opportunities, utility, or resources, but it also differs from entitlement approaches in
that labour accounts are based on current, rather than historical, data.
On the other hand, this paper provides a novel axiomatic framework to examine the
normative relevance of UEL exploitation theory, and to identify the appropriate definition —
or, at least, class of definitions — of exploitation. For, if LE defines the domain of admissible
UEL exploitation forms, then one may impose further restrictions on LE in order to identify
a core class of UEL approaches within the admissible set. Some examples of such restrictions
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are examined in section 7, but many others can certainly be identified. For example, as
suggested by an anonymous referee, one may argue that whenever an agent ν spends no
labour time at all in productive activities but her consumption expenditure can be placed,
say, in the top one per cent of the population, then any definition of exploitation should
be such that LνG = 0 and α
ν
lmin > 0, thus making the agent an exploiter.
47 Conversely, it
may be argued that whenever an agent ν spends her entire endowment of labour time in
productive activies and obtains an income barely sufficient to afford a subsistence bundle,
then any definition of exploitation should be such that κν (P, s)ανlmax < L
ν
G, — thus implying
that the agent is exploited — provided that others in the economy are well off.
Indeed, once the domain of admissible UEL exploitation forms is defined, one may try to
identify the normatively relevant properties that uniquely characterise one definition within
the admissible set. From this perspective, some central insights of exploitation theory,
such as the relation between class and exploitation status (Roemer’s [29] celebrated Class-
Exploitation Correspondence Principle) or the correspondence between positive profits and
the exploitation of at least the poorest segments of the working class (see, for example, the
Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle recently proposed by Veneziani and Yoshihara
[44, 45]) may be reformulated as axiomatic requirements.
Similarly, observe that LE allows for the possibility that all agents in the economy be
either exploited or exploiters. This is appropriate given the nature of LE as a minimum
domain condition, because even some of the classic definitions of exploitation - such as
Morishima’s [22] - do not exclude such possibility. Nonetheless, one may argue that the
appropriate definition of exploitation should rule it out. One way to do so is by explicitly
formalising the relational aspect inherent in exploitative relations, such that if an agent is
exploited, she must be exploited by someone, and vice versa, as suggested by Yoshihara and
Veneziani [52]:
Relational Exploitation (RE): At any equilibrium allocation z with prices (p, w, r),
N ter 6= ∅ if and only if N ted 6= ∅.
Within the domain identified by LE, are there any definitions that capture important
normative intuitions of UEL exploitation theory, such as the correspondence between class
47Observe that by LE κν (P, s) is strictly positive for all ν ∈ N . Further note that if λν = 0, then LνG = 0
according to both Axiom 12 and Axiom 13.
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and exploitation status, the relation between exploitation and profits, and RE? If not, and
an impossibility result followed from the imposition of these properties, this would arguably
raise serious questions about the UEL approach.
Some results by Yoshihara and Veneziani [52, 50, 44, 45, 46] suggest that there are defini-
tions that satisfy LE and these additional properties and, among all of the main approaches,
the only one satisfying all properties is Definition 5. Although these results are preliminary
and hold in specific economic settings, they do suggest that the axiomatic framework laid
out in this paper is both insightful and promising.
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9 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Consider any economy with a list
¡N ,M, P, (ων)ν∈N , (lν)ν∈N¢.
1. We show that if a definition of exploitation satisfies LE, then it satisfies Axioms 1-7.
By LE, at any z ∈ Z(p,w,r), there exist a profile of commodity bundles (cνmin, cνmax)ν∈N and
a profile of activities (ανmin,α
ν
max)ν∈N satisfying production objectivism such that for each
agent ν ∈ N , cνmin, cνmax ∈ B(ων, lν ; p,w, r) and ανmin,ανmax ∈ P with bανmin = cνmin, bανmax = cνmax,
and ανlmax = ανlmin. Therefore, Axioms 4, 5, and 7 are satisfied.
LE also implies that there exist a nonnegative vector (LνG)ν∈N and a positive vector
(κν (P, s))ν∈N such that
ν ∈ N ted ⇔ κν (P, s)ανlmax < LνG,
ν ∈ N ter ⇔ κν (P, s)ανlmin > LνG.
Then, for each agent ν ∈ N , let us define a function f ν such that fν(cνmin) = κν (P, s)ανlmin
and f ν(cνmax) = κ
ν (P, s)ανlmax hold. Denote L
ν
min ≡ fν(cνmin), Lνmax ≡ f ν(cνmax). Then, as
ανlmax = ανlmin, Lνmin 5 Lνmax holds. Thus, Axioms 3 and 6 are satisfied.
Moreover, by κν (P, s)ανlmax = L
ν
max and κ
ν (P, s)ανlmin = L
ν
min, we have ν ∈ N ted ⇔
Lνmax < L
ν
G and ν ∈ N ter ⇔ Lνmin > LνG. Therefore, Axiom 2 is satisfied.
Finally, for each agent ν ∈ N , only one of the following three holds: LνG < Lνmin; Lνmin 5
LνG 5 Lνmax; and Lνmax < LνG. According to the above discussion, the set of agents who are
neither exploiters nor exploited is given by
N n = {ν ∈ N |Lνmin 5 LνG 5 Lνmax} .
Then, it follows that N ter, N ted, and N n are pairwise disjoint and N ter ∪N ted ∪N n = N
holds. Thus, Axiom 1 is satisfied.
In summary, if a definition of exploitation satisfies LE, then it also satisfies Axioms 1-7.
2. We show that if a definition of exploitation satisfies Axioms 1-7, then it also satisfies LE.
Let a definition of exploitation satisfy Axioms 1-7. Consider any z ∈ Z(p,w,r). Axiom
1 implies that N ter, N ted, and N n are pairwise disjoint and N ter ∪N ted ∪N n = N holds.
Axiom 2 implies that for each agent ν ∈ N , there exist LνG = 0, Lνmin = 0, and Lνmax = 0
with Lνmin 5 Lνmax such that ν ∈ N ted ⇔ Lνmax < LνG and ν ∈ N ter ⇔ Lνmin > LνG. Moreover,
33
Axiom 3 implies that for each ν ∈ N , there exist cνmin, cνmax ∈ RM+ and a function fν such




ν(cνmax). By Axioms 4-5, for each ν ∈ N , cνmin, cνmax ∈
B(ων, lν; p,w, r), and cνmin, c
ν
max can be produced as net outputs. Moreover, by Axiom 6, for
each ν ∈ N , there exist production processes ανmin, ανmax ∈ P and a positive scalar κν (P, s)
such that bανmin = cνmin, bανmax = cνmax, Lνmin = κν (P, s)ανlmin, and Lνmax = κν (P, s)ανlmax. By
Axiom 2, κν (P, s)ανlmin 5 κν (P, s)ανlmax, and so ανlmin 5 ανlmax holds. Again, by Axiom
2, ν ∈ N ted ⇔ κν (P, s)ανlmax < LνG and ν ∈ N ter ⇔ κν (P, s)ανlmin > LνG. Thus, noting
that by Axiom 7 for any ν,μ ∈ N , if cνmin = cμmin and cνmax = cμmax, then Lνmin = Lμmin and
Lνmax = L
μ
max, it follows that the definition of exploitation also satisfies LE, as desired.
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